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Abstract 
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“We must and we are determined to encourage, support and guide the development of the nonpublic 
sectors of the economy…”  
Jiang Zhemin, Speech at the 16th CPC National Congress, 2002 
 
I. Introduction 
The spectacular growth of the private sector in China, which started from scratch since the 1990s, is 
well documented. Changes in politics are essential elements of this growth. However, dynamic 
aspect of the sweeping change in political economy associated with the growth of the private sector 
is rarely studied empirically in the economics literature. This paper contributes to the literature in this 
aspect.   
It is important to notice that when “the reform” officially started in the late 1970s and early 1980s, 
the reform agenda did not allow for setting up private firms, neither for privatization, and the private 
sector accounted for 0% of the Chinese GDP. Consistently, the Constitution of the Communist Party 
of China (CPC) [the 1982 version, which codified the reform agenda at that time] is unambiguously 
anti-capitalism. Its declares, “[t]he proletariat dictatorship will inevitably replace the dictatorship of 
bourgeoisie…Basically, the socialist system has incomparable superiority over the capitalist 
system …” (The CPC Constitution, 1982). However, the reform agenda has transformed gradually; 
both the CPC Constitution and the state Constitution were amended in 2002 and 2004, respectively, 
and the institutions were changed (for the reasons of these changes, see Xu, 2011). The essence of 
the constitutional amendments is the “Three Represents” theory, which is invented by Jiang Zemin, 
the party general secretary for 1989 – 2002. According to “Three Represents” theory, CPC should 
always represent the advanced social productive forces, the advanced Chinese culture and the 
fundamental interests of the majority people. Among all the three, representing the advanced social 
productive forces is emphasized as the priority. In particular, owners of non-public sectors was 
recognized as one of the three major advanced social productive forces (the other two are workers 
and intellectuals) for the first time by the ‘Three represents’ theory. Embracing entrepreneurs by a 
communist party, this theory deviates from Marxism, as Mr. Jiang said “…, private 
entrepreneurs,…are all builders of socialism with Chinese characteristics” (Jiang, 2002a). On policy 
implementation, Jiang emphasized, “We must and we are determined to encourage, support and 
guide the development of the nonpublic sectors of the economy… [All emphases in the citations in 
this section and the next section are added by the authors of this paper]”; “nonpublic sectors are 
important elements of the socialist market economy…” (Jiang, 2002b). The term “non-public” is 
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used to disguise “private” to avoid a direct contradiction to Marxism. Since then, party members are 
“encouraged” and “supported” to become private entrepreneurs; entrepreneurs are encouraged to join 
the party. Soon afterwards, a large number of party members become super rich entrepreneurs within 
a decade.1  
How could a large group of politically connected people become rich so rapidly within a very short 
period of time after the 2002/2004 constitutional amendments? This is the central question that we 
address in this paper. The anecdotes reported by the mass media are massive, many of which imply 
rent seeking of the party elites when they enter private sector. There are also discussions in political 
science literature. To our knowledge, however, there is no systematic research, which addresses this 
dynamic question by looking at nationwide data over the whole period of time. This paper examines 
the dynamics of rent seeking by Party members when the regime changed from anti-capitalistic to 
pro-capitalistic. The research is based on nationwide random surveys of private firms, which is 
designed to represent the population. Given that the Party is the dominant force both in politics and 
in the national economy in China (the next section elaborates this point), political connections in this 
paper are captured by a CPC membership or a People’s Congress (PC) membership. 2  We 
interchangeably use the terms “political connection” and “political elites.” This paper addresses the 
major dynamic question by looking at rent-seeking of political elite entrepreneurs in the old regime 
(before 2002/2004 regime change); and in the new regime (after the 2002/2004 regime change). We 
identify the causality of rent seeking and the political connections of private entrepreneurs.  
Economics literature on the relationships between political connections and economic variables is 
extensive. A group of economists investigate the economic value of political connections. In a 
seminal paper, Fisman (2001) reports that the Suharto’s health-related events caused a significant 
loss in the return on the price of the securities of politically connected firms. Faccio (2006) extends 
the scope of the investigation to 47 countries, and reveals that the announcement of entering politics 
                                          
1 Most of the richest people in China are Communist Party members, and numerous of them are selected (not elected) to 
the People’s Congress, the legislator. Nevertheless, the most striking phenomenon is that members of the National 
People’s Congress (PC) of China have become, by far, the wealthiest in the world, despite the highly incomplete and 
heavily underestimated data about these elites. The total wealth of the 70 richest members of the People’s Congress of 
China is US$90 billion, which is 12 times that of the total wealth of all the members of Congress, Supreme Court, and 
White House of the United States, which is US$7.5 billion (Bloomberg, February 27, 2012). 
2 A PC member may not be a CPC member, but he/she must be pro-CPC because all the PC members are selected by the 
CPC. Moreover, in terms of social status and power, average PC members are elites at a higher level than average CPC 
members. 
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by officers or large shareholders of a company is positively associated with the cumulative abnormal 
return, which varies depending upon political power. This line of research applied to various 
countries in different settings, namely, late Victorian Britain (Braggion and Moore, 2011), a 
longitudinal dataset of Italian companies (Cingano and Pinotti, 2009), Russia’s politically connected 
firms receiving preferential treatments by regional laws and regulations (Slinko, Yakovlev, and 
Zhuravskaya, 2005), and U.S. firms connected to Geithner as a nominee for Treasury Secretary by 
President Obama (Acemoglu, Johnson, and Kermani, 2010). 
Another group identifies the effect of political connections on access to bank loans and government 
subsidies. Using data from Pakistan, Khwaja and Mian (2005) claim that politically connected firms 
are able to borrow 45% more, but they are more likely to default by 50% compared to those without 
political connections. The findings of Johnson and Mitton (2003) and Faccio, Masulis, and 
McConnell (2006) support that political connections affect government or bank decisions. The 
former presents results that the decision on government subsidies is associated with political 
connections, whereas the latter shows that politically connected firms are more likely to be bailed out.  
Some sociological studies document the potential advantages of being a Party member in China. 
Evidence documented by Walder et al. (2000) shows that joining the Party is a necessary condition to 
become a leader in China. Li and Walder (2001) reveal that joining the Party in earlier periods of 
careers brings a difference. Those who have become Party members at an early time of their careers 
are reported to have significantly higher chances to become social elites, whereas those who are 
already successful before joining the Party would not bring a difference to their careers by joining 
the Party. Bian et al. (2001) suggests that everything being equal (i.e., controlling for talents and 
education/experience backgrounds), Party members have higher chances than non-Party members to 
become top managers in state-owned enterprises (SOEs). In their investigation of the changes after 
the massive purges of the “Cultural Revolution,” Walder and Hu (2009) argue that party elites, 
particularly their offspring, recovered much more quickly than others.  
Political connections and associated economic performance among Chinese firms have attracted the 
attention of economists, but there is no consensus among the findings in the literature. This implies 
further research is necessary. Examining listed firms, Fan et al. (2007) indicate that firms with 
politically connected top executives of new partially privatized firms are less efficient than other 
firms in terms of post-IPO performance. In contrast, Peng and Luo (2000) and Francis et al. (2009), 
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also looking at listed firms, demonstrate that political ties are beneficial to firms in terms of 
obtaining resources that enhance efficiency. Li et al. (2008) report a positive effect of political 
connections on firm performance based on one cross-sectional data of private firms collected in 2002. 
Yet, Chen et al. (2011) and Wu et al. (2012) document the heterogeneous effects of political 
connections; that is, the performance of SOEs is negatively affected by political connections, 
whereas that of private firms is slightly or positively affected by political connections. In addition to 
methodological reasons, there are two major reasons behind the seemingly inconsistent findings in 
the literature. The first reason is the static nature of the investigations in the literature. Given the 
reality is changing rapidly it is not surprise that findings about earlier time may not be consistent 
with the findings about later time. The second reason is the nature of the data used. Most of the data 
used are not representative. Each of the discoveries from different datasets captures one of the many 
facets of the reality.  
This paper studies dynamics of rent seeking by using a representative dataset. To our best knowledge, 
this is not only the first in studying rent seeking dynamics in China but also in the literature of 
political connection in general.3 We discover significant changes of rent seeking associated with the 
2002/2004 constitutional amendments. Moreover, we establish causality, which is not only 
statistically valid but also sensible economically, by carefully addressing the endogeneity and 
identification problems. 
Our major finding is that the regime change since the 2002/2004 constitutional amendments creates 
substantial rent seeking opportunities to the political elites. We first find that the politically 
connected elites did not enjoy statistically detectable rents when the constitutions were anti-
capitalistic, i.e. before the 2002/2004 amendments. Here, rent is measured by politically connected 
entrepreneurs’ more accessibility of bank loans than others (it is well documented that bank loans are 
heavily subsidized and in general private firms are in disadvantages in getting bank loans). We then 
find, following the constitutional amendments, politically connected entrepreneurs obtain 
substantially more bank loans than others. 
                                          
3 Calomiris, Fisman, and Wang (2010) involve dynamics, i.e. impacts of policy changes on the sale of government-
owned shares. A main difference between our paper and that of Calomiris, Fisman, and Wang (2010) is that we 
investigate a more fundamental change in the Constitution on private property rights. In addition, they apply event study 
method, whereas we conduct cross-sectional comparisons of firms across different periods. There is a growing literature 
in political science (e.g. Dickson, 2003; 2008), which involves dynamics of political economy in Chinese private sector. 
But the discoveries in that literature are based on party documents and field works, not nationwide representative data. 
Moreover, the focuses are different from that of this paper.   
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To address identification problem, we have deployed several approaches. We instrument CPC/ PC 
members by two instrument variables. The first IV is the frequency of the key word of the 
constitutional amendment, “the Three Represents,” appeared in the articles written by the provincial 
CPC Chief in party periodicals. The essence of “The Three Represents Theory” is to embrace private 
business (for an elaboration see next section). This instrument carries important economic meanings. 
On the one hand, although “the Three Represents” is a major ideological/institutional change of the 
CPC, it is not equally shared by all the party leaders in different provinces. Thus, everything else 
being equal, in provinces where the party chiefs emphasize and implement more on this principle, 
party members in those provinces should be further encouraged to enter the private sector and more 
entrepreneurs in those provinces should be likely to to join the party. As a result, in those provinces 
there should be more party member entrepreneurs than in other provinces. On the other hand, “the 
Three Represents” principle has no implication to support non-party member entrepreneurs in 
general. Indeed it is well documented that in general it is always difficult for private firms to obtain 
bank loans before and after the constitutional amendments. The above two properties imply that this 
is a valid IV, and indeed these properties are confirmed statistically as well.  
Our second IV is the existence of union in a firm. The economic justification of this IV is based on 
the following observations: a) the party has a policy to encourage party-member entrepreneurs to set 
up unions in their firms; thus, the existence of union should be positively correlated to the party 
membership of the entrepreneurs; b) the existence of union in a firm alone would not be directly 
related to the chance of getting bank loans, since a bank could interpret this as a burden to the firm 
unless the entrepreneur is politically connected. Both of these two properties for the validity of an IV 
are confirmed statistically. The results using theses IVs confirm the robustness of our basic findings. 
And the combination of our statistical evidence and institutional analysis (the next Section) suggests 
that the constitutional amendments have opened doors for party members’ rent-seeking.     
To further rule out other alternative interpretations, e.g. a possibility that the correlation we 
discovered is caused by recruiting effects that successful entrepreneurs, who are able to obtain more 
bank loans at the first place, are recruited into the party after the amendments, we run similar 
regressions by excluding all the new Party members, who joined the party after setting up a private 
business. Our basic findings remain robust. Thus, this alternative interpretation can be ruled out.    
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To rule out potential selection bias problem with our sample, we have examined the data carefully. 
We find new party members, i.e. those who joined the party in and after 2002, counted only for 8.2% 
of all the party members in the sample; whereas 78% of the party members in our sample joined the 
party before 1996 when private business was still at infant stage and was not recognized by the 
constitutions (Table 1).   
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section II discusses the institutional background about 
the Communist Party vis-à-vis the private sector; and the amendments of the Constitution. Section III 
introduces the data and provides the basic observations. Section IV presents our baseline results. 
Section V addresses the endogeneity and identification problems using an instrumental variable 
approach and excluding the sample that might be affected by reverse causality. Section VI concludes 
the paper.  
 
II. Institutional Background 
The backbone of China’s institution is the Communist Party of China (Xu, 2011). The Party controls 
all levels of governments, which directly determines or deeply influences the allocation of local 
resources through personnel control. Moreover, the Party determines the appointments of all the most 
important posts in the state sector, such as the CEOs and presidents of the major banks and the 
largest SOEs. Nearly all important posts are occupied by Party members; the rest are occupied by 
Party-trusted non-Party members. Thus, being a Party member, particularly being a veteran Party 
member, facilitates opportunities for political connections, which can be used for business. 
Furthermore, the Party controls all levels of the legislature, the People’s Congress, from the national 
down to the county level, mostly through the influence of selecting members of Congress. Literally, 
all non-Party Congress members must be Party-trusted persons. 
The Communist Party has launched economic reforms since 1978. The private sector was not 
allowed under the communist rule, and a change in this policy was not in the reform agenda. The 
development of the private sector and privatization occurred after the mid-1990s when the state 
sector was in deep trouble and when privately owned firms do not have de jury rights (Xu, 2011). 
The de facto private sector took off rapidly since 1997 when de facto privatization got permission in 
a disguised way. From 1998 to 2005, the output of the private sector increased by 20 times, and its 
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share in total GDP increased from only 2.5% in 1998 to nearly 50% in 2009, thus becoming the 
largest sector in the Chinese economy.  
As the private sector, outside of the conventional control sphere of the party, became the major 
engine of the Chinese economy, and hired more urban employees than other sectors did, the party’s 
weedy leadership in this sector was further weakened. The private sector’s share of the nationwide 
party membership was only 2.8% in 1999, and this share steadily declined further dropped to 1.7% in 
2002 (Table 2), when this sector was expanding at an extraordinary speed.  
Facing this daunting challenge, the party has to find new ways to exercise its leadership (Jiang, 
2000).4 At the beginning of 2000, Jiang Zemin proclaimed that entrepreneurs should be recognized 
as “advanced productive force” (The CPC Maoming City Propaganda Department, 2002),5 that 
Party members should be encouraged to become entrepreneurs, and the Party should legitimately 
recruit entrepreneurs on a large scale. Jiang said “how to strengthen the leadership of the party in 
[this sector]” is the most important. For this purpose, we are required to “ensure that the Party plays 
its role as the leadership core in exercising overall leadership and coordinating the efforts of all,” to 
satisfy entrepreneurs’ “reasonable interest requirements.” “Ways party organizations playing a 
central role in politics…should be tailored to the characteristics of the [private] enterprises, and 
should be intimately linked to their business operations” (Jiang, 2000).  
The most important legacy of these efforts is the invention of the “Three Represents” theory, which 
deviates from Marxism by embracing entrepreneurs. In the official report to the 16th CPC National 
Congress, which codified the “Three Represents” into the Party’s constitution, Jiang explained, “… 
private entrepreneurs,…are all builders of socialism with Chinese characteristics” (Jiang, 2002a). 
About the importance, Jiang said, “Persistent implementation of the ‘Three Represents’ is the 
foundation for building our Party, the cornerstone for its governance and the source of its strength.” 
(Jiang, 2002a). In another occasion in the Congress, Jiang also said, “We must and we are 
determined to encourage, support and guide the development of the nonpublic sectors of the 
economy…”; “nonpublic sectors are important elements of the socialist market economy…” (Jiang, 
                                          
4 In 2000, only 17% of private firms in our sample have Party organizations within the firm. In 2004, the Financial 
Times reported that only 1.1% of the private firms in Shanghai had Party organizations. It is likely that the average size of 
the firms in our sample is larger than the average size of the firms in the population; thus, our sample might be over-
representing the firms that have established Party branches.   
5 The term “productive force” is a central concept in Marxism. The productive forces consist of the means of production, 
and labor power. The central argument of Marxism is that advanced productive forces determine the progress of an 
economy, but capitalism inherently and ultimately prevents the advancement of productive forces.  
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2002b). To avoid a direct contradiction to Marxism, private sector is denoted as non-public sector. 
Following the amendment of the Party’s Constitution, in 2004, the Constitution of the state was also 
amended to recognize private property rights.  
The implementation of the “Three Represents” principle is a high priority of the party, and the way it 
should be implemented is instructed by Jiang’s 2000 and 2002 speeches: “Ways party organizations 
playing a central role … should be intimately linked to their business operations.” (Jiang, 2000); “We 
must and we are determined to encourage, support and guide the development of the nonpublic 
sectors of the economy…” (Jiang, 2002). These important points were later further elaborated into 
various specific local policies by local party officials. The following examples illustrate some 
concrete suggestions advocated by different local party heads. A Jiangsu local party official wrote, 
“Solving difficulties in business is the focal point of the party-building task [in private sector].” “We 
must implement the “Three Represents” by taking practical activities, we must think what 
entrepreneurs would think and must worry what entrepreneurs would worry.” (The Mass (Qunzhong), 
No.8, 2002). A Zhejiang local party official said “being useful [to the business] is the life of party 
building task. Thus, we must work very hard … to transform the party organization’s political force 
into business productivity.” (Zhejiang Today (Jinri Zhejiang), No. 13, 2003). Equally importantly, 
there were a substantial proportion of provincial party chiefs who did not like the idea of 
encouraging private entrepreneurship but had to implement the policy inactively. The instrument 
variables that we deployed in the paper explore this variation.  
With the party’s encouragements and supports in both political and economic spheres, a large 
number of party elites have entered the private sector since the constitutional amendments. In our 
sample, from the year 2000 to the year 2006, the percentage of party members among entrepreneurs 
is doubled from about 20% increased to 40%; and 78% of the party-member entrepreneurs have 
joined the party for at least 10 years (Table 1), i.e. they are veteran party members.  
  
III. Data and Descriptive Statistics  
The dataset used in this paper comprises four cross-sectional surveys on the private sector in China. 
These surveys were conducted in 1995, 2000, 2006, and 2010 through face-to-face interviews. The 
survey questionnaires and sampling schemes were designed by a research team consisting of 
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economists and sociologists from the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences and several Chinese 
universities. The survey series was organized by a CPC central committee department, the United 
Front Work Department, and two ministry-level central government agencies, that is,the National 
Association of Industry and Commerce, and the State Administration for Industry and Commerce. 
This survey series, which is the largest of its kind in China, has traced the development of the private 
sector in the nation as a whole since the sector began to emerge. 
A stratified random sampling procedure is applied to ensure that the survey is representative of the 
population of the registered private firms in China. The stratifications are based on locations, 
industries, stages of economic development, and distribution of private firms in urban and rural areas 
within each location (a city or a county). The surveys covered over one-third of the cities in China. 
The sample size of the 1995 survey comprises 2,869 private firms located in 160 cities; 3,073 private 
firms located in 129 cities for the 2000 survey; 3,837 private firms located in 109 cities for the 2006 
survey; and 4,624 private firms located in 158 cities for the 2010 survey.  
The summary statistics are shown in Table 3, which presents the summary statistics of the financial 
data of the firms over the four survey years. The statistics indicates that on average, firms owned by 
CPC or PC members are larger than those owned by non-CPC/ PC owners in terms of sales, number 
of employees, and equity value for all the years. In particular, the difference in size between the 
CPC/ PC-owned firms and non CPC/ PC-owned firms was substantially enlarged since 2000. In 
general, firms owned by CPC members are twice as large as those owned by non-CPC members ones 
while firms whose owner are PC members were larger at least three times of the firms owned by 
non-PC members since 2000. Moreover, firms owned by CPC or PC members obtain more bank 
loans (measured by the bank loan to equity ratio) than the other firms for 2000, 2006 and 2010, when 
the data are available. However, it does not show obvious difference in terms of the performance 
(measured by return over equity (ROE) and return over sales (ROS)) between firms owned by CPC/ 
PC members and those owned by non-CPC/ PC members. The 2006 survey asked when the owner of 
the firm joined CPC. Panel B of Table 2 reports this information. It shows that about 50% CPC 
owners joined CPC before 1988 when the private sector was legally recognized for the first time.6 
Additionally, over 75% CPC owners joined CPC before 1997 when the non-public economy was 
                                          
6 The central government issued the Tentative Stipulations on Private Enterprises (TSPE) in June of 1988. According to 
TSPE, private enterprises hiring more than eight employees were illegally recognized for the first time in China.  
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admitted by the 15th CPC congress as an important component of the Chinese Socialist Market 
Economy for the first time. Only 8.48% of CPC owners joined CPC after 2002. This suggests that 
most of firm owners in our sample joined CPC before they started private businesses.  
 
IV. Political Connections and Rent-seeking Opportunities: Empirical 
Results  
The amendments of the Constitution of the Party in 2002 and of the Constitution of the state in 2004 
have transformed institutional settings for economic agents in China.7  Prior to the amendments, 
private entrepreneurship was illegal under the State Constitution, and was in direct conflict with the 
Party’s ideology and policy. Chinese private enterprises were formally discriminated against SOEs in 
terms of access to bank loans and other resources (Brendt and Li, 2003). Anyone with political 
connections (e.g., a PC member or a veteran Party member working in a government agency or SOE) 
who considers becoming to a private entrepreneur should weigh political and economic risks against 
economic gains.  
In contrast, risks and benefits associated with becoming an entrepreneur might have changed after 
the amendments to the two Constitutions which legitimatized and encouraged private 
entrepreneurship. Moreover, given the monopolistic position of the government in controlling 
resources, those PC members or veteran Party members might have preferential treatments in 
accessing resources thanks to their political connections. Hence, we hypothesize that a turning point 
occurred in the period of 2003 to 2004 from which political connections became a significant factor 
in determining business advantages, whereas this factor was not significant before the period. 
In order to capture the effects of the constitutional amendments on the rent seeking of entrepreneurs, 
we focus on bank loan access by private business owners prior to and posterior to 2003/2004. Access 
to external financial sources is one of the most precious resources for entrepreneurial firms. This 
scarcity of access to external finance is even more severe with the private sector in China. Moreover, 
bank loans are heavily subsidized, which made the cost of capital in China be among the lowest in 
                                          
7 The key aspects of the amendments of CPC and PRC are the recognition of the legitimate social status of private 
entrepreneurs, and encouragement of private entrepreneurship, and the recognition and protection of private ownership, 
including private businesses, respectively.  
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the world (Lardy, 2012). Consequently, anyone who is able to obtain bank loans enjoys rent 
generated by these subsidies.  
China’s banking system has long been dominated by the four large state-owned banks that mainly 
serve state-owned enterprises. Even the newly established shareholding banks are not entirely 
independent from the government, and have biases against lending to private enterprises. By the end 
of 2000, the bank loans issued to private business were barely accounted for 1% of the total short-
term bank loans, whereas the total industrial outputs of private businesses consisted over 5.26% of 
the total GDP in China during the same period. The bank loans issued to private businesses 
substantially increased after the constitutional amendments of CPC: it increased by 2.2 times from 
RMB 65.46 billion in 2000 to RMB 208.1 billion. However, in contrast to the sharp increase in the 
share of the private sector to total GDP which was about 50% in 2009, bank loans that went to 
private businesses accounted only for 4.9% of total short-run bank loans in the same year. In other 
words, bank loan allocation to the private sector disproportionally lagged behind the development of 
private businesses in China in the last decade. Although there are strong discriminations against the 
private sector in lending, the interest rate in China is equal to either SOEs or private firms as it is set 
and fixed by the central bank.  
In order to test whether a significant change occurred after the amendment in the Constitution, we 
regress access to bank loans on CPC/ PC membership using the data of four cross-sections, that is, 
1995, 2000, 2006, and 2010,. We use a logit estimation when our dependent variable is a binary one. 
We estimate the following logit equations: 
εγβα +++= ')or  ( XCPCPCY �                                             (1) 
'')or  ('' εδβα ++×+= XCPCPCPostY �                                       (2)                                            
 
Model (1) is a logit regression for each of the four cross-sections, namely, 1995, 2000, 2006, and 
2010. Y refers to Bank loan as a dummy variable that equals to one if the firm has bank loans at 
the time of survey and equals to zero if otherwise. CPC (PC) are a dummy variable that equals 
to one if the firm’s owner is a CPC (PC) member at the time of survey and equals to zero if 
otherwise.  X is a vector of control variables.8 In order to measure whether the changes are 
                                          
8 Control variables include entrepreneur-specific factors including age, gender, education, owner’s previous experience, 
13 
 
systematically related to the constitutional changes, we also conduct pooled regressions by 
dividing the four cross-sections into two periods: pre-amendment period (i.e. 1995 and 2000) and 
post-amendment period (i.e. 2006 and 2010). Model (2) refers to regression specification for the 
pooled data. ‘Post’ is a dummy variable that equals to one if the surveys were conducted after the 
constitutional amendments (i.e. 2006 and 2010) and equals to zero if the surveys were conducted 
before the amendments (i.e. 1995 and 200). A positive association between Post and Bank loan 
in Model 1 suggests a higher probability of access to bank loan after the constitutional changes. 
If the interaction term between Post and CPC/ PC membership in Model 2 is positively and 
significantly correlated with Bank loan, it will provide evidence that political elites have higher 
probability to gain bank loans than those non-political elites after the constitutional amendments. 
The definitions of the variables used in estimations are presented in the Appendix (Table A1).  
 
In addition, we conduct a series of regressions for 
 
µωλκ +++= ')or  ( XCPCPCZ �                                             (3) 
'')or  ('' µηλκ ++×+= XCPCPCPostZ �                                       (4)                                            
 
where Z refers to the ratio of total bank loans to total equity of the firm. In the same way as we 
estimate Equations (1) and (2), Equations (3) and (4) are estimated using both the annual data of 
2000, 2006, and 2010 and the pooled data.9  
 
Tables 4 and 5 report the results for logic regressions and OLS regressions, respectively. Columns (1) 
and (3) of Table 4 show that CPC membership is not associated with bank loan for the years of 1995 
and 2000. However, as shown in columns (5) and (7) of the same table, CPC is positively and 
significantly correlated with Bank loan for the years of 2006 and 2010, that is, for the post-
amendment period. The marginal effect of CPC membership is 0.08 in 2006 and 0.06 in 2010, which 
means that the probability of obtaining the bank loan is higher for CPC membership entrepreneurs by 
                                                                                                                                           
and the share of stocks held by owners. We also control age, size, incorporation type, past performance, and the 
experience of privatization of the firm. Finally, industry and regional effects are also controlled. For the pooled 
estimations, year fixed effects are controlled as well.  
 
9 The data on the amount of bank loan are not available for 1995. 
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8% in 2006 and 6% in 2010. Moreover, column 9 shows the interaction term between CPC and Post 
in the pooled regression determines bank loan significantly and positively.  
Similar results regarding the effect of CPC membership on bank loan are obtained from the OLS 
estimations using the ratio of bank loans over total equity. As shown in Table 5, CPC positively 
influences the dependent variable in 2006 and 2010 (columns (3) to (5)) but not in 2000 (column (1)). 
At the same time, the interaction term between CPC and Post is also significantly and positively 
correlated with bank loans over total equity in the pooled regression. These results suggest that CPC 
membership did not increase a probability to access to bank loans or help to obtain bank loans during 
the period before the Party/ State constitutional amendments. Contrastingly, during the period after 
the Party/State constitutional amendments, firm owners with CPC membership had a significantly 
higher probability to access bank loans and obtained a larger amount of bank loans over equity than 
those without CPC membership. The impact of PC membership on access to bank loans shows a 
similar pattern as is the case of CPC membership. The probability of access to bank loans was higher 
for firm owners with PC membership in the years of 2006 and 2010. The marginal effect of PC 
membership on obtaining bank loan is 14% and 18% for the years of 2006 and 2010, respectively. 
Nevertheless, there are notable differences between the results regarding CPC membership and those 
regarding PC membership. First, the marginal effects of PC membership on bank loan are higher 
than those of CPC membership. These results may reflect the fact that PC members are higher level 
elites than CPC members. Second, in Tables 4 and 5, PC membership enters significantly in 
determining bank loan in 2000 while CPC membership does not in the same year. One can argue that 
taking advantage of their more prestigious positions PC members might be able to obtain information 
on the treatment of private entrepreneurs by the state earlier than CPC members do. When Jiang 
Zemin proclaimed the recognition of entrepreneurs at the beginning of 2000, a number of PC 
members might be informed about the profound political and economic implication of such a 
proclamation. Thus, some entrepreneurs with PC membership moved ahead of the formal changes in 
the Constitutions. In addition, these intended changes might have affected the lending practice of the 
banks as well. As the changes were announced and became official after 2002, the effects of PC 
membership on bank loans might have increased. The larger magnitude in the coefficients on PC 
membership in 2006 and 2010 compared to that in 2000 may illustrate such effects.  
Another interesting observation from the estimations is that the variable Post is significantly and 
negatively correlated with both probability to obtain bank loans and the ratio of bank loans over total 
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equity, with the exception of column 10 of Table 4. The results imply that, on average, bank loan 
became less accessible for private businesses after the 2002/2004 constitutional amendments 
compared to the previous period.  
We address possible concerns that our results are driven by some other factors coincidentally 
associated with the political status of the entrepreneurs. We check such a possibility using various 
control variables. First, we look at whether or not our results are affected by higher capability of 
CPC/ PC members in running their businesses than non-CPC-owners. If CPC/ PC members are more 
capable, they can acquire more bank loan than those owned by non-CPC member owners in 2006 
and 2010. To deal with this possibility, we control the past performance of the firm, i.e. ‘RoS’, which 
is measured by the ratio of return to total sales of the firm in the previous year, for the 2006 and 2010 
estimations.10 As shown in Tables 4 and 5, CPC/ PC membership is significantly and positively 
correlated with bank loan access in 2006 and 2010 even after controlling the firm’s previous 
performance. Second, we check whether or not our results are influenced by connections with the 
government regardless of political status of firm owners, or inherited connections with the 
government in the case of privatized SOEs.11 Two variables related to these issues are controlled in 
the aforementioned regressions. We control the previous working experience of the entrepreneur in 
our regressions. This dummy variable ‘Owner exp’ equals to one if the entrepreneur has previously 
worked as a civil servant or a manager in an SOE, or has served in the army before starting up a 
private business. Otherwise, this variable equals to zero. The entrepreneur’s previous experience may 
be a proxy for both her/ his capability and her/ his connections with the governments. Controlling the 
working experience of the entrepreneur may also help to address the capability assumption 
mentioned in the previous paragraph. We also control the experience of privatization of SOE in 2006 
and 2010 as such information is unavailable for the other years. Firms privatized from former SOEs 
may have better connections with the local governments, and the owners of such privatized firms are 
also more likely to be CPC/ PC members. The variable ‘Prtvz’ is equal to one if the firm was 
privatized from a former SOE and equal to zero if otherwise. The results on the significant effects of 
CPC/ PC membership on bank loan as shown in Tables 4 and 5 are obtained with both firm owner’s 
                                          
10 Information on the profit and total sales of the firm in previous years is available only for the years of 2006 and 2010.   
11 A strong wave of privatization of SOEs in China occurred from the late 1990s (Guo et al., 2010). We investigate 
whether these inherited relationships with the government allowed privatized SOEs to access to bank loans more easily 
than the other firms. 
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experience (Owner exp) and the privatized firms from SOEs (Prtvz) used as control variables. These 
indicate that our main findings are robust to the inclusion of such variables and thus reflect the 
genuine effects of political connections on bank loan. As regards firm owner’s experience, having a 
previous experience in government-affiliated agencies increases the entrepreneur’s accessibility to 
bank loans and the ratio of bank loan over equity for the firm in 2006 and 2010 while it matters 
neither for probability to access to bank loans nor for the amount of bank loans before the 2002/2004 
amendments.   
To summarize, we find the effects of the political status on the access bank loans and the amount of 
bank loans are dynamically associated with the constitutional amendments of CPC and the State in 
China. Before constitutional changes that officially recognized and encouraged private 
entrepreneurship , political connections formed by CPC membership or PC membership did not 
bring substantial benefits to the entrepreneur in acquiring bank loans. In contrast, after the 
amendments, entrepreneurs with such political connections have significant advantages to obtaining 
the scarce resources such as bank loan compared to those without such connections.  
 
V. Robustness Check: Addressing Endogeneity 
In the previous section we report that the effects of entrepreneurs’ political connections on the access 
to bank loans are associated with the 2002/2004 constitutional amendments. However, there may be 
alternative competing interpretations to these dynamic effects. In particular, it is possible that the 
empirical specifications adopted in the previous section suffer from endogenity of the key variables, 
that is, CPC/ PC membership. Such endogeneity can be caused by the following reasons: (1) the poor 
identification of the effect of CPC/ PC membership on bank loan; (2) reverse causality; (3) the 
different capability of the party member entrepreneurs associated with timing of joining the party; (4) 
difference in financial constraints between party member entrepreneurs and non- party member 
entrepreneurs. In this section, we deal with each of these concerns. 
Identification issues related to the political rents in 2006 and 2010 
First of all, we must make sure that the observed significant relationship between bank loan access 
and CPC/ PC membership in 2006 and 2010 is not driven by omitted variables. When CPC/ PC 
membership is used as an independent variable, we implicitly assume its exogeneity to outcomes; 
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however, this may not be true. The recruitment of CPC/ PC is not random. CPC/ PC members might 
be more capable than others. If so, the observed significantly more bank loan access by CPC/ PC 
members in 2006 and 2010 might be driven by the higher ability of CPC/ PC members in those years. 
Although in the reported regressions the entrepreneur’s previous working experience, education and 
the past performance of the firm have controlled for, certain unobservable factors might still be 
omitted.  
To address this identification concern, we employ the two-staged Least Square estimation procedure 
to identify CPC/ PC membership effects. In particular, we employ two instrumental variables to 
identify the effects of political connections. The first one, CVRG, is the frequency of the key words 
‘Three Represents’ shown in articles, covered by the Database of Chinese Communist Party 
Construction Periodicals, written by the Party Chief of a given province in the past two years before 
the survey. The Database of Chinese Communist Party Construction Periodical (Zhonggong Dantjian 
Qikan Shujuku) is the largest database of digitalized CPC Periodicals that covers 215 major CPC 
periodicals starting from 1994. Besides a couple of dozens of national level CPC periodicals 
published by the CPC central agencies, such as Qiushi, Dangjian and Hongqi, most of the periodicals 
in the database are published by party committees of all provinces and some major cities. The sub-
national level Party periodicals are the major platform for the provincial/municipal party committees 
to promote major policies. This instrumental variable satisfies the two conditions of exogeneity and 
relevance. First, the frequency of the phase ‘Three Represents’ mentioned by the Party Chief implies 
how much weights are given to this new policy by the provincial level CPC committee. The essence 
of “The Three Represents Theory” is to embrace private business. We hence expect a higher 
likelihood of both party members’ becoming entrepreneurs in the private sector and private 
entrepreneurs’ joining the party in provinces where provincial Party Chiefs emphasize more on 
‘Three Represents’. However, the frequency of the phase of ‘Three Represents’ mentioned by the 
CPC chief of the province should not be related to the error terms that affecting the individual firms’ 
bank loan access.  
The second instrumental variable is the existence of labor union in a firm. The economic justification 
of this IV is based on the following observations. According to China’s Labor Union Law adopted in 
2001, every organization should set up a labor union including non-SOEs and the unions are 
controlled by the government. However, the law requires that most of the funding of the union comes 
from the enterprise: every unionized firm has to pay 2 percent of its payroll to the local branch of 
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‘All-China Federation of Trade Unions’ (ACFTU) and 0.5 percent of its payroll to finance its own 
union. Therefore, a union needs the consent of the management to be set up within a firm. In practice, 
not all private firms followed the laws by setting up a union. By the end of 2009, only 53 percent of 
urban workers are Union members. As unionization is encouraged by the Party, we expect CPC/ PC 
members are more likely to unionize their firms. However, the existence of labor union in a firm 
alone should not be directly related to the chance of getting bank loans since this could be interpreted 
in different ways by a bank, e.g. as a burden to the firm unless the entrepreneur is politically 
connected.  
Table 6 reports the two-stage probit model regressions (a la Newey, 1987) for accessibility of bank 
loan when the CPC/ PC membership is instrumented by Union and CVRG. The first stage regression 
results in Panel B of Table 6 confirm that instrumental variables Union and CVRG are significantly 
and positively correlated to CPC and PC memberships. The Wald tests of exogeneity are significant 
for all the models that suggest that our instrumental variables are valid and the two-stage probit 
models are properly identified. Panel A of the table presents the estimation results of the second stage, 
in which the CPC/ PC membership is instrumented using Union and CVRG. It shows that both CPC 
and PC memberships are positively and significantly correlated with the bank loan dummy.12 This 
indicates the causality that political connections increase the accessibility of bank loans after the 
amendments.  
Table 7 shows 2SLS regressions for bank loan over equity ratio. With two instrumental variables, we 
are able to run Sargan test (Sargan, 1958). The first stages estimations are reported in Panel B. It 
shows that the Anderson Cannon Correlation statistics are significant, which confirms the 
relationship between the instrumental variables, CVRG and Union, and CPC/ PC membership is 
sufficiently strong. Moreover, the Sargan statistics for all the models range from 0.15 to 0.99 that 
suggest the null hypothesis is not rejected, thus statistically confirm the exogeneity of the 
instrumental variables. Panel A of Table 7 reports the second stage estimations of the 2SLS 
regressions. It shows that both CPC and PC memberships are positively and significantly correlated 
with the bank loan over total equity ratio. This confirms the causality that political connections bring 
more bank loans to politically connected firms after the amendments. 
Reverse causality 
                                          
12 We only focused on 2006 and 2010 because the political elites have received more bank loans during these years. 
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Another concern is a potential reversed causality that party member entrepreneurs might join the 
Party to obtain bank loan more easily. Or, they might be recruited into the party because they were 
already successful, which may appear more access to bank loans. (next subsection deals with this and 
so we should delete this). In order to address this issue, we repeat the regressions using a subsample 
of CPC/ PC members excluding those recruited after they set up private businesses. The data on year 
when CPC members joined the part are available only in the 2006 survey, which we use in these 
regressions. In this way, our estimates are sharpened by focusing on the veteran Party members or 
the true political elites that have remained in the Party for a long time. Table 8(a) presents the results 
of the OLS and the logit estimations. Columns (1) and (2) are for the CPC members, whereas 
Columns (3) and (4) are for the PC members. The results show that both CPC and PC memberships 
are still significantly and positively associated with Bank loan and Bank loan/ equity in the logit and 
OLS estimations, respectively. The results for the subsample are consistent with those of the whole 
sample found in the previous section. Table 8(b) reports the 2SLS and two-stage logit models for 
Bank loan/ equity and Bank loan respectively by using the two instrumental variables. Again, the 
results are consistent with those from the OLS and logit estimations for the whole sample. This 
confirms that the veteran Party members obtain more bank loans than the others in 2006, i.e. after the 
amendments.  
Selection bias caused by the timing of joining the Party  
When a party member entrepreneur joined the party might have implications on his/her motives, on 
his/her capabilities, and on how deep he/she is connected etc., which imply potential selection bias 
problem. Some specific concerns are that individuals who joined the party earlier might be more 
capable of running businesses (although we have controlled entrepreneurs’ capabilities, e.g. their 
previous experiences etc.), or better connected13; whereas, after the amendment in 2002, party 
recruiting was aggressive and less selective, which might have implications for lower capabilities. To 
address this issue, we look into the information on when a party member entrepreneur joined the 
Party, and how this timing affects the rent seeking outcomes. Table 1 shows, that according to the 
data from the survey conducted in 2006, those who joined the party in and after 2002, who can be 
                                          
13 For instance, joining CPC could be an investment if an individual anticipates of running private business in t
he future. Or, the effect of the CPC membership may take time to carry materialize in the form of preferential treatment 
like Fraser et al. (2006) point out that “political ties (like other relationships in the non‐western world) take a long time to 
develop”. One might argue even further that this delayed effect may be the reason that an entrepreneur who joined the 
party in the late 1990s would not be able to extract significant rent until later. 
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called new party members, counted for only 8.5% in the sample. Contrastingly, more than 78% of the 
party member entrepreneurs in the sample are veteran party members joined the party before 1996 
when private business was not legal.  
Given the small proportion of the cohort of new party members, our conjecture is that the impact of 
this cohort to the overall results should be limited. To test this formally based on these data, we 
construct a dummy variable CPC_Post2002 that equals to one if party member entrepreneur joined 
the Party in or after 2002, and equals to zero otherwise. Table 9 reports the estimation results. As 
shown in Column (2) and (4), the related interaction term is insignificant in both regressions. This 
confirms our conjecture.    
Although it is possible that joining the party earlier would cultivate political connections deeper, it is 
also reasonable to argue that there must be a decreasing return to scale for this political connection 
cultivation process. Given the overwhelming majority party members in our sample are veteran 
member, our conjecture is that there will be a decreasing return to scale for cultivating connections 
by joining the party and thus marginal changes in how long one has stayed in the party should not 
have a significant impact. To test our hypothesis, we construct a variable CPC_Age, which measures 
the duration of the party membership. We add the interaction term between CPC and CPC_Age into 
the regressions. As seen in Column (1) and (3) of Table 9, the interaction term involving CPC_Age is 
statistically insignificant. This also confirms our conjecture.    
Omitted variable: Financial constraints 
Finally, a potential alternative argument is that the significant relationship we discovered is driven by 
more financial constraints faced by the party member entrepreneurs than the others. Our approach to 
address this concern is based on well documented fact that bank loans are very precious for private 
firms. For example, in 2010 when the private sector accounted for half of the total GDP in China, 
only less than 5% of the total bank loans went to private sector. To test whether party member 
entrepreneurs are more financially constrained than others, we conduct the regressions on whether 
they have borrowed from informal financial sector. Loans from the informal financial sector charge 
much higher interest rates and bear much higher risks.14 Firms without serious financial constraints 
                                          
14 The financial sector in China is highly regulated. Most informal lending is not legal. Nonetheless, informal lending 
has surged as small businesses are often eschewed by the nation’s major state-owned banks, which lend mainly to major 
SOEs (Wall Street Journal, March 14, 2012). According to the UBS report, the informal loans could be between two 
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tend to avoid these high-cost, high-risk loans. Table 10, the regression results for 1995, 2000, and 
2006 (relevant data are unavailable for 2010), indicates that the party member entrepreneurs were 
indifferent from others in involving informal lending activities. Moreover, we find firms owned by 
party member entrepreneurs are more likely to distribute dividends than other firms. All of these 
findings suggest that party member entrepreneurs were not financially more constrained than others. 
 
VI. Conclusion 
The existing studies on political connections are mostly restricted to a static setting. In a rapidly 
changing world like China, errors associated with missing the dynamics may be very large. By 
studying dynamics of political connections, this paper makes a contribution to the literature.   
The central issue being addressed by this paper is about the impact of the constitutional amendments 
on the relationship between political connections and economic rents before and after the regime 
changes in China. Numerous anecdotes report that since the constitutional amendments political 
elites benefit from their political connections by obtaining scarce resources when they become 
private entrepreneurs. But this dynamics is not explored in any systematic way in the literature. 
Concretely, our systematic empirical work addresses the following questions. (1) In the old regime, 
which is anti-capitalistic, compared to commoners, do political elites enjoy rents when they enter the 
private sector? (2) After the regime is changed to more pro-capitalistic, do political elites enjoy rents 
when they enter the private sector? (3) What is the rent seeking mechanism?   
Based on a firm level dataset collected from nationwide random sampling surveys over 15 years, we 
find the following dynamics of rent seeking. In the old regime, the Party social elites did not enjoy 
statistically detectable rents. Controlling for all other factors (e.g., characteristics of the individuals, 
firms, industry, location, etc.), the bank loans the Party social elites obtained are similar to those 
obtained by other entrepreneurs. However, the rent became significant after the constitutional 
amendments. In the new regime, firms owned by Party social elites obtained significantly more bank 
loans compared to other firms. By identifying the large majority of these party member entrepreneurs 
as veteran party members and by instrument party members by the party policies, we not only 
                                                                                                                                           
trillion yuan and four trillion yuan in total, or $316 billion to $632 billion, which is slightly less than 10% of the 
country’s GDP in 2011. Without legal protection, entrepreneurs who borrow informal loans not only take legal risks, but 
also pay a reported annualized lending rate of 14% to 70% for loans (reported by Credit Suisse, September 2011). 
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establish the evidence of rent seeking after the regime change, but also identify the causality and the 
mechanism. Through the channel of our instrument (the “Three Represents”), which captures how 
strong a province push forward the regime change, our evidence indicates that the basic policy of the 
new regime is the cause for fast growing rent seeking in Chinese private sector.   
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Table 1: Years when CPC member joined CPC (2006 sample)  
Year  Number % Cumulative % 
1951-1996 996 77.51 77.51 
1997-2001 230 14.01 91.52 
2002-2006 109 8.48 100 
Total 1285 100 100 
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Table 2: Growth of China’s Private Sector and the Share of CPC Members  
Year Private Industrial Enterprises Share of CPC Members 
 Gross Output (100 
million Yuan) 
Share of 
GDP (%) 
Share of National 
Industrial Output (%) 
CPC Members in 
SOE Sector (%) 
CPC Members in 
Private Sector (%) 
1998 2082.9 2.47 3.07 32.37 2.76 
1999 3244.6 3.62 4.46 32.37 2.40 
2000 5220.4 5.26 6.09 31.89 2.29 
2001 8760.9 7.99 9.18 32.63 1.86 
2002 12950.9 10.76 11.69 31.88 1.70 
2003 20980.2 15.45 14.75 29.09 3.08 
2004 35141.3 21.98 17.42 28.26 3.60 
2005 47778.2 25.83 18.99 27.95 3.87 
2006 67239.8 31.08 21.24 27.75 4.15 
2007 94023.3 35.37 23.21 27.40 4.55 
2008 136340.3 43.41 26.87 27.17 4.71 
2009 162026.2 47.58 29.55 - - 
Sources: China Statistical Yearbook, 1999-2010; Selected Statistics of Communist Party of China, 1921-2010, Beijing: 
Dangjian Duwu Press 2011 
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Table 3: Summary Statistics for 1995, 2000, 2006, 2010 
Variables 
 
Year of the surveys CPC Owner PC Owner Non CPC/ PC Owner Full Sample 
Mean S.D Mean S.D. Mean S.D. Mean S.D. 
Age of firm 1995 4.32 2.64 5.9 4.26 4.53 3.66 4.61 3.72 
2000 5.82 3.86 6.80 4.21 6.51 5.9 6.48 4.00 
2006 7.4 4.4 8.4 4.5 6.6 4.3 7.04 4.4 
2010 8.9 4.5 10.2 4.2 7.9 4.7 8.7 4.7 
State share (%) 1995 1.2 5.4 1.02 4.98 0.68 3.97 0.77 4.27 
2000 0.3 2.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.2 2.3 
2006 0.8 4.9 0.6 3.6 0.3 2.9 0.5 3.8 
2010 0.4 3.8 0.3 2.8 0.2 2.8 0.3 3.3 
CEO share (%) 1995 89.9 23.0 87.7 25.2 92.0 20.5 91.4 21.0 
2000 72.6 30.4 75.5 28.8 81.0 25.6 78.2 27.7 
2006 64.5 28.3 67.3 26.6 70.2 25.4 68.2 26.7 
2010 61.7 29.5 64.3 28.7 67.3 28.2 65.2 28.8 
Sales (RMB mil) 1995 6.7 19.6 11.9 23.9 5.3 14.1 5.6 14.9 
2000 18.6 39.8 28.2 49.8 9.9 26.9 15.9 37.0 
2006 53.9 118.6 86.9 145.7 21.4 57.3 39.2 96.8 
2010 74.9 182.3 122.6 242.1 33.1 114.4 57.8 160.1 
No. of employees 1995 104.0 177.3 160.7 224.9 80.7 149.9 85.0 153.2 
2000 216.3 636.6 319.3 730.2 92.5 230.9 171.1 637.2 
2006 209.1 423.5 357.1 548.5 106.0 262.5 157.9 348.7 
2010 198.4 381.0 320.1 491.8 94.3 255.3 157.2 341.3 
Equity (RMB mil) 1995 2.7 7.1 4.8 10.6 2.1 6.3 2.4 6.8 
2000 9.4 21.3 13.7 26.2 4.5 12.8 7.8 19.7 
2006 12.2 24.6 20.6 32.6 7.1 18.6 10.2 22.6 
2010 21.8 46.8 35.6 59.9 10.1 33.1 17.4 42.5 
Bank loan/equity 1995 n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 
2000 0.6 0.9 0.7 1.0 0.3 0.7 0.5 0.8 
2006 0.7 1.7 0.9 1.8 0.4 1.2 0.6 1.5 
2010 0.9 2.5 1.1 2.5 0.7 2.0 0.8 2.3 
Bank loandummy 1995 0.21 0.41 0.20 0.40 0.19 0.39 0.2 0.4 
2000 0.48 0.50 0.52 0.50 0.34 0.47 0.38 0.49 
2006 0.56 0.50 0.68 0.47 0.38 0.49 0.46 0.50 
2010 0.62 0.49 0.74 0.44 0.46 0.50 0.55 0.50 
ROE 1995 0.62 1.19 0.68 1.27 0.68 1.34 0.65 1.27 
2000 0.2 0.3 0.2 0.3 0.2 0.3 0.2 0.3 
2006 0.3 0.6 0.4 0.7 0.3 0.5 0.3 0.6 
2010 0.4 0.8 0.4 0.8 0.3 0.7 0.3 0.8 
ROS 2006 0.1 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.1 0.2 
2010 0.1 0.2 0.1 0.2 0.1 0.2 0.1 0.2 
Union 2006 0.58 0.49 0.72 0.45 0.33 0.47 0.45 0.50 
2010 0.53 0.50 0.66 0.47 0.29 0.45 0.42 0.49 
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Table 4: Logit Regression on Whether the Firm Has Bank Loans 
Dependent:  
Bank loan 
1995 2000 2006 2010 Pooled 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
Owner C.           
CPC  .125  .071  .191***  .146**    
 (.133)  (.081)  (.072)  (.062)    
PC  .018  .215**  .354***  .479***   
  (.187)  (.100)  (.080)  (.075)   
CPC*Post         .234***  
         (.070)  
PC*Post          .872*** 
          (.086) 
Gender -.153 -.103 -.162 -.064 -.184* -.258*** -.027 -.012 -.279*** -.292*** 
 (.157) (.164) (.101) (.124) (.104) (.099) (.089) (.095) (.087) (.092) 
Edu .017 .030 -.018* -.006 .005 .005 .008 -.002 .025** .018 
 (.019) (.021) (.011) (.015) (.014) (.013) (.012) (.013) (.011) (.012) 
Age -.009 -.006 -.009** -.012** -.009* -.008* -.004 -.001 -.008** -.007* 
 (.006) (.006) (.004) (.005) (.004) (.004) (.004) (.004) (.004) (.004) 
Owner shr -.006*** -.005* -.012 .026 .000 .000 .001 .000 -.012*** -.011*** 
 (.002) (.002) (.124) (.158) (.001) (.001) (.001) (.001) (.001) (.001) 
Owner exp .032 -.040 .060 .035 .148** .187*** .243*** .293*** .289*** .327*** 
 (.175) (.194) (.071) (.088) (.074) (.070) (.091) (.010) (.069) (.072) 
Firm C.           
Age .022 .012 -.015* -.016 .026*** .024*** .028*** .025*** .068*** .061*** 
 (.014) (.015) (.008) (.010) (.010) (.009) (.007) (.008) (.007) (.007) 
Size .005 .004 .004*** .006*** .032 .030 .020 .020 -.011 -.100 
 (.003) (.003) (.001) (.002) (.005) (.005) (.003) (.003) (.006) (.006) 
Org .036 -.027 .172** .135 .147* .099 .217*** .204** .249*** .201*** 
 (.114) (-.126) (.069) (.087) (.082) (.079) (.076) (.081) (.066) (.071) 
Privtz     .008 .037 -.215* -.279*   
     (.127) (.125) (.129) (.146)   
ROS     -.128 -.119 .133 .083   
(t-1)     (.089) (.086) (.164) (.176)   
Control V.           
Post         -.172* -.096 
         (.088) (.091) 
Ind. Eff. Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Reg. Eff. Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Const .067 -0.196 1.291*** 1.360*** .238 .190 -.102 -.135 .748*** .546** 
 (.463) (.501) (-.307) (-.402) (.354) (.343) (.303) (.328) (.253) (.268) N 997 860 1865 1252 1707 1819 2135 1896 6302 5666 
pseudo R2 .047 .047 .037 .038 .113 .114 .116 .139 .125 .130 
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Table 5: OLS Regression on Bank Loan over Equity Ratio 
Dependent Var: 2000 2006 2010 Pooled 
Bank loan/equity (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Owner chrtcs         
CPC .072  .403***  .316*    
 (.076)  (.145)  (.184)    
PC   .507***  .551***  .740***   
  (.087)  (.154)  (.203)   
CPC * Post       .345***  
       (.100)  
PC * Post        .678*** 
        (.114) 
Gender -.170 -.058 -.279 -.342 -.059 -.194 -.282** -.392*** 
 (.117) (.136) (.220) (.210) (.277) (.285) (.137) (.145) 
Edu -.025** -.025* .034 .045* .047 .053 .023 .033* 
 (.013) (.015) (.028) (.027) (.036) (.037) (.017) (.018) 
Age -.008* -.011** -.027*** -.021** -.021* -.019 -.016*** -.015** 
 (.004) (.005) (.009) (.009) (.012) (.012) (.006) (.006) 
Owner shr -.216* -.206 .001 .001 .003 .002 .001 .001 
 (.118) (.145) (.003) (.003) (.003) (.003) (.002) (.002) 
Owner exp .051 .126 .363** .421*** .421 .585** .228** .336*** 
 (.069) (.081) (.149) (.140) (.259) (.270) (.098) (.103) 
Firm chrtcs         
Age -.020** -.027*** .042** .036* .103*** .093*** .059*** .053*** 
 (.008) (.009) (.020) (.019) (.021) (.022) (.010) (.010) 
Size .023*** .017* .047*** .041*** .027*** .023*** .031*** .028*** 
 (.008) (.010) (.007) (.007) (.005) (.005) (.003) (.004) 
Org .141** .101 .296* .274* .383* .310 .327*** .267** 
 (.070) (.083) (.169) (.163) (.231) (.241) (.101) (.109) 
Privtz   .034 .075 -.462 -.554   
   (.250) (.246) (.369) (.397)   
ROS   .075 .066 -1.119** -1.096**   
(t-1)   (.179) (.172) (.516) (.531)   
Control vars         
Prd       -.934*** -.802*** 
       (.174) (.183) 
Ind. Eff. Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Reg. Eff. Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Const 1.531*** 1.201*** -.505 -.873 -1.287 -1.347 .222 -.084 
 (.309) (.371) (.712) (.688) (.899) (.938) (.381) (.407) 
N 1031 726 1715 1827 1922 1733 4980 4571 
pseudo R2 .034 .056 .044 .042 .026 .030 .025 .029 
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Table 6 : Two-stage Probit Regressions for Bank Loan in 2006 and 2010  
 
Panel A. Second Stage of Two-stage Probit Model: Dependent Var: Bank loan 
 2006 2010 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Owner C     
CPC 3.805***  5.659***  
 (.862)  (1.444)  
PC   2.984***  2.210*** 
  (.575)  (.428) 
Gender .053 -.403*** .615** -.015 
 (.174) (.130) (.259) (.110) 
Edu -.031 -.014 -.075** -.022 
 (.023) (.017) (.034) (.016) 
Age -.048*** -.016*** -.060*** -.009* 
 (.012) (.006) (.017) (.005) 
Owner shr .003 -.001 .006** -.002 
 (.002) (.002) (.003) (.001) 
Owner exp -.845*** .116 -.701** .233** 
 (.263) (.091) (.315) (.115) 
FirmC     
Age .030* .016 .044*** .005 
 (.016) (.012) (.016) (.010) 
Size .000*** .000 .000** .000*** 
 (.000) .000 (.000) (.000) 
Org .110 -.028 -.108 .075 
 (.131) (.105) (.188) (.099) 
Privtz -.550** .168 -1.425*** -.531*** 
 (.241) (.162) (.420) (.178) 
Ros (t-1)  -.156 .016 -.780* -.064 
 (.141) (.113) (.434) (.207) 
Control     
Ind. eff. Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
Reg. eff. Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
Const 1.268** .320 1.547** .308 
 (.614) (.440) (.788) (.394) 
N 1707 1819 2135 1896 
Prob>chi2 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Panel B. First Stage of The Two-stage Probit Model: Test of the IVs  
 2006  2010  
 (1) CPC (2) PC (3) CPC (4) PC 
IVs      
Union .263*** .575*** .168*** .621*** 
 (.074) (.081) (.065) (.075) 
CVRG .051*** .027* .067*** -.004 
 (.014) (.014) (.021) (.024) 
N 1707 1819 2135 1896 
Pseudo R-sq 0.177 0.148 0.106 0.137 
Prob>chi2 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Wald test of exogene
ity. 0.00 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
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Table 7: 2SLS Regressions for bank loan over equity in 2006 and 2010  
 
Panel A. Second Stage of 2SLS: Dependent Var: Bankloan/equity   
 2006 2010  
 (1) (2) (3) (4)  
Owner C      
CPC 1.957***  3.544**   
 (.697)  (1.393)   
PC   1.688***  2.032***  
  (.549)  (.713)  
Gender .069 -.131 .349 -.141  
 (.141) (.122) (.253) (.180)  
Edu .007 .022 -.029 .022  
 (.019) (.016) (.035) (.026)  
Age -.033*** -.014*** -.049*** .022***  
 (.009) (.005) (.017) (.008)  
Owner shr .002 .00 .006** .001  
 (.002) (.002) (.003) (.002)  
Owner exp -.339 0.125 -.521* .101  
 (.214) (.086) (.315) (.183)  
Firm C      
Age .011 2.95-e4 .056*** .0242  
 (.013) (.012) (.016) (.016)  
Size 2.06-e5*** 6.58-e6 1.13-e5*** 4.04-e6  
 (5.22-e6) (7.34-e6) (4.07-e6) (4.57-e6)  
Org .099 .059 -.186 -.116  
 (09.106) (.101) (.191) (.162)  
Privtz -.279 .095 -.893** -.533*  
 (.194) (.153) (.406) (.290)  
ROS (t-1)  .122 .198* -1.446*** -1.090***  
 (.114) (.108) (.414) (.341)  
Control Var      
Ind. eff. Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes   
Reg. eff. Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes   
Const  .850* .146 1.725** .859  
 (.495) (.416) (.807) (.630)  
N 1715 1827 1922 1733  
Prob > F 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000  
Panel B. First Stage of 2SLS: Test of the IVs   
 2006  2010   
 (1) CPC (2) PC (3) CPC (4) PC  
IVs       
Union .089*** .145*** .060** .186***  
 (.024) (.020) (.024) (.023)  
CVRG .016*** .007* .027*** -.002  
 (.004) (.004) (.008) (.007)  
N 1715 1827 1922 1733  
R-sq .221 .152 .137 .151  
P 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000  
Anderson Canon corr. 0.00 0.00 .0001 0  
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Sargan stat .996 .453 .24 .15  
Note: Estimations in first stage were conducted with the full set of the explanatory variables used in 2nd stage but presented without the 
results for the sake of the space. The full results are available upon the request.  
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Table 8: Veteran CPC-member owners & access to bank loan, 2006 
(a) OLS and Logit estimations on bank loan accessibility  
 
(1)  
Bank loan 
(2)  
Bank loan/equity 
(3)  
Bank loan 
(4)  
Bank loan/equity 
CPC  .214*** .445***   
 (.077) (.155)   
PC    .361*** .564*** 
   (.083) (.160) 
N 1641 1641 1753 1753 
Chi-sq 263.70 215.63 283.09 218.78 
P 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 
(b) 2SLS estimations on bank loan accessibility  
Panel A 2nd stage of 2SLS 
 
(1)  
Bank loan 
(2)  
Bank loan/equity 
(3)  
Bank loan 
(4)  
Bank loan/equity 
CPC  4.383*** 2.314***   
 (1.105) (.866)   
PC    2.933*** 1.646*** 
   (.587) (.565) 
N 1641 1641 1753 1753 
Chi-sq/Wald-chi2 107.17 2.98 179.53 3.49 
P 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Panel B first stage of 2SLS 
 CPC CPC PC  PC 
Union  0.082*** 0.145***   
 (.024) (.021)   
CVRG   0.013*** 0.006 
   (.004) (.004) 
N 1641 1641 1753 1753 
R-sq 0.257 0.257 0.152 0.152 
P 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Anderson Canon corr. 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Sargan stat .4743 .4743 0.3980 0.3980 
Notes: Estimations were conducted with the full set of the explanatory variables but presented without the results on the 
other variables for the sake of the space. In 2SLS, CVRG and Union were used as instrumental variables.  
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Table 9: Duration and Timing of Being CPC member and Bank Loan Access, 2006  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Bank loan/equity Bank loan/equity Bank loan Bank loan 
Owner C     
CPC .445* .383** .316* .322*** 
 (.238) (.152) (.196) (.124) 
CPC*CPC_age -.003 
 
-.001  
 (.012) 
 
(.010)  
CPC*CPC_Post2002  .132  -.034 
  (.301)  (.255) 
Gender -.253 -.274 -.264 -.297* 
 (.219) (.220) (.172) (.172) 
Edu .036 .035 .002 .002 
 (.028) (.028) (.023) (.023) 
Age -.025** -.027*** -.014* -.015** 
 (.010) (.009) (.008) (.007) 
Owner shr .001 .001 .001 .001 
 (.003) (.003) (.002) (.002) 
Owner exp 0.323** 0.368** .220* .239* 
 (0.152) (0.150) (.125) (.123) 
Firm C     
Age  .043** .042** .042** .042** 
 (.020) (.020) (.017) (.016) 
Size  4.60-e5*** 4.73-e5*** 7.86-e5*** 6.84-e5*** 
 (7.41-e6) (7.20-e6) (1.23-e5) (1.13-e5) 
Org  .281* .298* .198 .218* 
 (.169) (.169) (.136) (.135) 
Prvtz -.023 .035 .032 .037 
 (.252) (.250) (.211) (.208) 
Ros (t-1) .098 .075 -.165 -.190 
 (.180) (.179) (.148) (.146) 
Control V     
Ind. Eff Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
Reg. Eff.  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
Const -.563 -.534 .377 -.758 
 (.734) (.715) (.604) (.599) 
N 1686 1715 1678 1707 
pseudo R-sq .041 .044 .115 .115 
chi2 202.6 219.6 267.5 272.5 
p 4.34e-27 2.71e-30 2.01e-41 2.10e-42 
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Table 10: Logit Regressions on Whether the Firm has Informal Loans 
Dependent  Var: 
Informal Loan  
1995 2000 2006 Pooled 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Owner chrcts         
CPC  .110  .035  -.022  .078  
 (.132)  (.077)  (.124)  (.102)  
PC   .207  -.036  .017  -.008 
  (.178)  (.094)  (.136)  (.123) 
Gender -.248 -.196 -.235** -.275** -.119 -.083 -.409*** -.402** 
 (.162) (.168) (.104) (.127) (.191) (.175) (.144) (.161) 
Edu .032* .034 .000 -.017 -.045** -.051** .000 -.018 
 (.019) (.021) (.009) (.015) (.023) (.022) (.014) (.018) 
Age .017*** .015** -.009** -.009* -.002 -.002 -.001 -.000 
 (.006) (.006) (.004) (.005) (.008) (.007) (.005) (.006) 
Owner shr -.002 -.000 -.467*** -.381** .002 .002 -.001 .001 
 (.002) (.003) (.117) (.148) (.002) (.002) (.003) (.003) 
Owner exp .095 .235 .172** .160* .342*** .316*** .299*** .315*** 
 (.166) (.175) (.068) (.084) (.126) (.115) (.095) (.111) 
Firm chrcts         
Age -.026* -.026* .000 .010 -.028* -.024* -.021* -.014 
 (.015) (.016) (.008) (.010) (.015) (.014) (.011) (.013) 
Size -.001 -.001 -.031*** -.016 .000 .000 .000 .000 
 (.004) (.004) (.010) (.012) (.006) (.006) (.001) (.001) 
Org -.043 -.025 .027 .092 .231 .182 .081 .167 
 (.115) (.126) (.067) (.084) (.147) (.137) (.089) (.105) 
Privtz     .140 .130   
     (.192) (.190)   
Control vars         
Yr Eff.       Yes Yes 
Ind. Eff. Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Reg. Eff. Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Const -1.562*** -1.971*** .508* .390 -1.104** -1.021* -1.305*** -1.656*** 
 (.464) (.512) (.289) (.382) (.561) (.537) (.457) (.525) 
N 1135 966 1824 1227 2027 2178 5044 4426 
pseudo R2 .029 .027 .031 .029 .054 .051 .169 .178 
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Appendix: Table A1: Definition of variables  
 Variables Definition 
Dependent 
variables 
Bank loan A dummy variable that equals to one if the firm has bank loans at the time of 
the survey and equals to zero if otherwise 
Bank loan/ 
Equity 
The ratio of the bank loans to total equity of the firm in the survey year 
CPC_app a dummy variable that equals to one if the entrepreneur has submitted an 
application to join CPC (2006 survey) or has the desire to join CPC (2010 
survey) at the time of survey and equals to zero if otherwise 
Informal loan a dummy that equals to one if the firm has borrowed from informal lending at 
the time of survey and equals to zero if otherwise (only for 1995, 2000, 2006). 
Independent 
Variable: post  
constitutional 
amendments  
Post a dummy variable that equals to one if the survey was conducted after 2002 (in 
2006 and 2010 in our sample) and equals to zero if otherwise (in 1995 and 
2000 in our sample) 
Independent 
variables: owner 
characteristics 
CPC  a dummy variable that equals to one if the entrepreneur of the firm is a CPC 
member at the time of the survey and equals to zero if otherwise. 
PC  a dummy variable that equals to one if the entrepreneur of the firm is a PC 
member at the time of the survey and equals to zero if otherwise. 
Gender a dummy variable that equals to one if the entrepreneur is a female and equals 
to zero if otherwise 
Edu the total schooling years of the entrepreneur 
Age the age of the entrepreneur at the time of the survey 
Owner shr the percentage of equity held by the entrepreneur in total shares 
Owner exp a dummy variable that equals to one if the entrepreneur once worked as a civil 
servant or a manager of a SOE firm, or, served in army before he/she started 
this business and equals to zero if otherwise. 
 CPC_Post2002 a dummy variable that equals to one if the CPC member joined the Party after 
2002 
 CPC_age the duration of the CPC membership (since he/she joined the Party at the time 
of survey by year)  
Independent 
variable: firm 
characteristics 
Age the age of the firm at the time of the survey 
Size the total sales of the firm in the survey year 
Org a dummy variable that equals to one if the firm is a limited liability company 
and equals to zero if otherwise 
Prvtz a dummy variable that equals to one if the firm was privatized from a State-
owned enterprise and equals to zero if otherwise 
ROS  the return over sales of the firm 
Instrumental 
Variables  
Union  a dummy variable that equals to one if the firm has a labor union at the time of 
survey 
CVRG The frequency of the word ‘three represents’ shown in the articles written by 
the CPC chief of a given province covered by the Database of CPC 
Construction Periodicals in the past two years before the survey.  
 
 
 
 
